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Abstract  
Although intermediate goods trade is an important part of global value chains (GVCs), the study to date of the 
transactions between more capable developed country suppliers and less capable developing country customers has 
been largely neglected in GVC literature. Case studies have suggested that, as a result of adopting a turnkey 
solution strategy, the governance pattern under this relationship is usually “market.” Information and knowledge 
flows are highly restricted. In contrast to this literature, we discovered in our study that a group of Japanese small 
suppliers formulated various service strategies (problem solving, technological advice, joint product development, 
etc.) to make themselves indispensable to their Chinese customers. They created a typical “relational” governance 
links with local customers and provided them with ample learning opportunities. Here, we make it clear that 
characteristics of industry and market are important to establishing this type of relational governance. With limited 
managerial resources, active marketing activities and localization have helped small suppliers to internationalize 
themselves so as to apply their strong capabilities to the Chinese market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to clarify the role of capable, small suppliers in global value chains 
(GVCs) by conducting a case study of a group of Japanese small suppliers operating in 
China that were able to successfully establish business relationships with Chinese 
customers. 
 
Existing literature on GVCs has previously focused solely on the business relationships 
that exist between developed country lead firms and developing country suppliers. Lead 
firms are considered to be dominant and suppliers to be subordinate. Innovation and 
solutions originate with lead firms in downstream value chains and upstream suppliers 
are likely to accumulate capabilities and upgrades only if they interact closely with lead 
firms and learn from them (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi et al., 2005; Morrison et al., 2008; 
Pietrobelli, 2011). 
 
However, these studies have neglected to consider an important aspect of GVCs, 
namely the existence of widespread transactions between more capable developed 
country suppliers and less capable developing country customers. Recent literature 
suggests that, as a demand hub in a simple GVC trade network1, China has become the 
most important intermediate goods market for major East Asian countries such as Japan 
and Korea (GVC Development Report 2019, p.31). Initially, foreign companies 
operating in China played a central role in purchasing these goods. Along with the 
expansion of the domestic market, the role of Chinese firms as intermediate goods 
buyers has become increasingly significant. 
 
Unlike local suppliers in the traditional GVC model, Chinese firms do not work for 
foreign buyers. They produce final products and independently organize production and 
distribution. These firms are achieving rapid growth primarily by exploring the Chinese 
market, especially its middle and low-end segments. With limited technological 
capability, Chinese firms are facing great pressure for industrial upgrading and 
increased reliance on high-quality intermediate goods provided by foreign suppliers 
(Watanabe ed., 2014). 
 
In contrast, suppliers from developed countries have strong technological capabilities, 
and therefore play a crucial role in facilitating production, design, and product 
                                                   
1 In a simple GVC trade network, factor contents cross a national border for production only once. 
For details, see Wang et al. (2017).  
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development. Suppliers are considered an important source of industrial 
competitiveness (Asanuma, 1989; Porter, 1990, Sako, 1992; Nishiguchi, 1994; 
Watanabe, 1997, Henke and Zhang 2010). 
 
Suppliers can be categorized into several types, according to firm size, or their position 
in the value chain. This paper focuses on Japanese small suppliers that supply parts, 
materials, machinery, and equipment, along with those engaged in the processing 
business and their business relationships with Chinese customers. In this study, we 
identify the types of products or services that these small suppliers provide to customers, 
the implications of their activities for value chain governance, and how they overcame 
various internationalization difficulties to establish business relationships with Chinese 
customers. 
 
The major findings of this case study are threefold. First, Japanese small suppliers 
performed various services (e.g., problem-solving, technological advice, and joint 
product development) to Chinese customers in addition to providing high-quality 
intermediate goods. Second, Japanese small suppliers adopted complex relational 
governance links with their Chinese customers. There are rich information flows 
between the two parties, thereby providing Chinese customers with ample learning 
opportunities regarding process improvement, quality control, and product development. 
Third, Japanese small suppliers facilitated internationalization through proactive 
marketing activities and localization. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 attempts to combine these lines of literature so 
as to generate basic research questions as it affects this paper. Section 3 gives an 
introduction of the background and data of this case study. Section 4 analyses the case 
of 15 Japanese small suppliers. Section 5 presents the conclusions.  
 
2. Literature review 
 
There are three lines of literature concerning this study. The first line of literature is 
relevant to the studies of the role of suppliers in the enhancement of industry 
competitiveness, particularly those concerning the success story of Japanese 
manufacturing sectors.  
 
In his classic work, Porter (1990: pp.101–103) argues that the presence of 
internationally competitive supplier industries in a nation creates advantages in 
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downstream industries in several ways, such as creating efficient access to intermediate 
goods, ongoing coordination, and greater opportunities for innovation and upgrading. 
Henke and Zhang (2010) stated that innovation-related supplier activities can help 
enhance the competitiveness of a firm’s supply chain. Suppliers invest resources in 
technology to create innovative products or processes that could support potential future 
business as well as share technology with the customer without the assurance of future 
purchase orders. 
 
Studies on Japanese suppliers have suggested that capable suppliers, both large firms 
and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), are a major source of the international 
competitiveness of Japanese manufacturing sectors (Asanuma, 1989; Sako, 1992; 
Nishiguchi, 1994; Watanabe, 1997). As for tier one suppliers, Asanuma (1989) in this 
study identified the widespread existence of the so-called Design-Approved (Shoninzu) 
Suppliers in manufacturing sectors, who have relation-specific skills, that are capable 
enough of proposing new designs to lead firms, in comparison to the common 
Design-Supplied (Taiyozu) suppliers. Watanabe (1997: 314) underlines three unique 
characteristics of the capabilities of small suppliers at tier two or below: Firstly, 
Japanese suppliers typically have world-class technological capabilities. In their own 
specific sectors, the technological levels of Japanese suppliers are usually higher than 
“parent companies”; secondly, Japanese small suppliers are supported by a flexible, 
specialized production network that has enabled these firms to respond to rapidly 
changing market demands; thirdly, Japanese small suppliers have strong capabilities 
with respect to proposing new designs or technological advices to lead firms, which can 
be used in the interests of collaborating on new product development. 
 
However, the aforementioned studies all focused on relationships between domestic 
suppliers and customers. Therefore, this paper’s first research question is: In a highly 
globalized era, what types of products, services, or knowledge can Japanese small 
suppliers provide to their Chinese customers and what role can they play in GVCs? 
 
The second line of literature has primarily focused on the role of large key component 
suppliers (mostly platform leaders) in facilitating the development of high-tech sectors 
in emerging markets. Case studies of Intel’s chipsets in the note PC industry (Tatsumoto 
et al., 2009), Media Tek (MTK)’s baseband IC in the mobile phone industry (Imai and 
Shiu, 2007; Ding and Pan, 2014), Mitsubishi’s engine in the automobile industry 
(Marukawa, 2014), Taiwanese makers’ ICs in the LCD TV industry (Watanabe, 2014), 
Japanese makers’ compressors in the air conditioning industry (Watanabe, 2014) 
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indicate that foreign suppliers have widely adopted turnkey solution strategies to 
succeed in emerging markets, particularly China.  
 
Using a GVC governance framework, the characteristics of governance arrangements 
for turnkey solutions and their consequences can be summarized as follows.2 First, to 
avoid complex coordination activities, multiple hardware and software is generally 
integrated into a single module, which is usually a black box and not accessible to 
customers. Second, suppliers provide a reference design with customers, teaching them 
how to design and assemble a final product, and how to purchase intermediate goods. 
Third, the adoption of turnkey solutions has greatly reduced technological barriers to 
entry, generated strong external scale economies, and eventually enabled the emergence 
of numerous local final product assemblers. Meanwhile, turnkey solutions generate 
predominantly market-based relationships, which leave little room for tacit 
knowledge-learning and capability formation.3  
 
The case of Taiwanese chipset maker MTK is representative of a turnkey solution 
strategy. In the era of the 2G feature phone, MTK integrated the baseband IC and the 
multimedia application processor into a single chipset platform, packaging the operating 
system, various applications (e.g., MP3 players, phone camera drivers, etc.), and 
sometimes the user interface into its chipset software (Imai and Shiu, 2007). MTK 
further conducted most of the system design and part of the platform software design 
and provided a reference design for their customers, which made most mobile phone 
components easier to use. As a result, the feature phone value chain in China became 
highly disintegrated, with numerous independent firms specializing in narrow 
production processes. 4  In such a value chain, governance type is typically an 
arm’s-length market that is characterized by disadvantages such as highly homogenous 
products and grave imitations. Only marginal innovation was allowed on the platform 
(Brandt and Thun, 2011; Ding, 2014). 
 
In contrast to the conclusions drawn in existing literature, we discovered that a 
“relational” value chain has developed between Japanese small suppliers and their 
                                                   
2 Gereffi et al. (2005) identified five distinct types of GVC governance in terms of degree of 
transactional complexity, ability to codify transactions, and supply-base capabilities: market, 
modular, relational, captive, and hierarchical. 
3 There may be more modular-like business relationships with fewer larger, preferred customers 
who have the technological capabilities to customize the key components to some extent. 
4 The product development of a feature phone usually involves two separate processes: the design 
house and the system integrator. During the peak in China, the number of these two parties reached 
500 and 2000, respectively. 
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Chinese customers. Such relationships reveal the characteristics typical of relational 
governance as defined in the GVC literature: an exchange of complex tacit information, 
frequent face-to-face interaction, close mutual dependence between suppliers and 
customers, and high levels of asset specificity (Gereffi et al., 2005: 84, 86). Our second 
research question is thus: When compared with large key component suppliers, why are 
Japanese small suppliers so keen to adopt relational governance with Chinese customers 
given that doing so is costly and time-consuming? 
 
The third stream in the literature concerns the internationalization of SMEs, particularly 
in the case of emerging markets. Returning to the aforementioned work of Porter (1990: 
103), he strongly noted that “having a competitive domestic supplier industry is far 
preferable to relying even on well-qualified foreign suppliers. …Proximity of 
managerial and technical personnel, along with cultural similarity, tends to facilitate 
free, and open information flow. Transaction costs are reduced.” This argument implies 
that the internationalization of suppliers is a very difficult process. 
 
Ivarsson and Alvstam (2013: 585)’s case study of Swedish small suppliers in China 
supports Porter’s perspective, indicating that the liability of foreignness is a serious 
problem for SMEs when entering distant and unfamiliar foreign markets. According to 
this study, when they were unable to forge business partnerships in China, Swedish 
suppliers had to target customers from Sweden or other Western countries who shared 
similar business backgrounds. 
 
In the case study of the Danish wind turbine component suppliers in China, Haakonsson 
and Slepniov (2018: 467) similarly highlighted the following:  
 
“SMEs are generally less ‘fit’ for internationalization than large firms. They  
have traditionally relied on their home networks related to their NIS (National  
Innovation System), proprietary processes and unique products; therefore, they  
are highly dependent on long-standing relationships with buyers.” 
 
An interesting finding of this study is that because the technological capabilities of local 
lead firms were limited, it was difficult to create complex and long-standing 
relationships with Chinese lead firms as well as with lead firms in the domestic market. 
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Danish small suppliers thus standardized or modularized their products and managed to 
establish “modular” type business relationships with local customers.5  
 
In summary, the literature suggests that with the difficulty of internationalization, it is a 
challenge for small suppliers to maintain a similar business relationship with local 
customers in emerging markets as well as in their domestic market. The third research 
question is thus: Since small businesses’ reliance on domestic networks is so high and 
internationalization is so difficult, how have Japanese small suppliers succeeded in 
creating a complex relational governance relationship with Chinese customers and 
internationalized themselves? 
 
3. Background and data 
 
3.1 Background 
 
Since the 2000s, Japanese SMEs began making active investments in the Chinese 
market, which forms the very background of this case study. This was a result of the 
changes in the governance pattern and the market conditions occurring in the Japanese 
manufacturing sector. 
 
The governance structure of Japanese manufacturing sectors has been considered 
captive relations between a few large lead firms and some specific small suppliers 
(Watanabe, 1997; Sturgeon, 2002). After the burst of the bubble economy in the early 
1990s, however, the lead firm itself has faced stagnant growth and has not been able to 
ensure long-standing and stable orders for small suppliers. Meanwhile, as a result of 
long-term specialization, small suppliers have accumulated similar or stronger 
technological capabilities over lead firms in their specific sectors. In this situation, it 
was no longer advantageous for small suppliers to maintain captive relations with lead 
firms. Many small suppliers began to seek new customers by independently formulating 
strategies, and the relationship between the two parties became increasingly balanced. 
Using the term of GVC literature, a more “relational” governance structure has been 
gradually formed. Tokyo Shoko Research (2012)’s survey data on 6587 small 
subcontractors in Japan shows that the number of customers catered by small suppliers 
                                                   
5 This study uses the term “modular” to describe governance arrangements between Danish 
suppliers and Chinese customers. However, some cases in this paper appear to be market rather than 
modular since the product is standardized and Chinese customers simply accept it. As Sturgeon 
(2002) highlighted, without customization, product modularity would not necessarily lead to value 
chain modularity. 
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has continued to grow since 1990s (see Table 1), and small suppliers’ dependence on the 
largest customer in terms of transaction volume has continued to decline (see Table 2).6  
 
<Table1> 
<Table2> 
 
One important method for small suppliers to increase their independence from lead 
firms is to explore overseas markets. Since the 2000s, as the growth of Japanese market 
has reached its limits, the strong demands of overseas markets have become 
increasingly attractive. As Table 3 illustrates, since 2005, “strong local demands or 
good expectation on local demands,” compared to “ensure cheap and qualified labor,” 
or “follow customers and other Japanese firms,” has consistently been the most 
important determinant for small businesses in determining whether to invest in an 
overseas market or not.  
 
<Table 3> 
 
China is the most important country which Japanese small suppliers have invested in. In 
2011, the geographical distribution of small firms’ overseas branches is China 
(including Hong Kong, 44.6%), other Asian countries (34.4%), North America (11.4%), 
Europe (6.0%), and others (3.6%) (Small Business White Paper 2014). Most Japanese 
small firms in China are aiming at its huge domestic demands. According to another 
survey, regarding the question about “why does your company plan to expand or 
maintain the Chinese business,” 61.9% of Japanese small businesses answered that “we 
can expect business expansion based on the size and potential of the market,” far ahead 
from the second largest answer (25.6%), “our business is established, and it is on track” 
(JETRO 2014). These firms appear to have better performance in China than in Japan. 
In the Japanese market, the average share of loss-making small manufacturers between 
1983 and 2007 was 37.1%, while in China only 24.9% small manufacturers predicted 
they would be making a loss in 2013.7 
                                                   
6 Regarding the degree of independence of suppliers, two points are noteworthy. First, the impact of 
2018 financial crisis should not be neglected. Both the data of the number of customers and the data 
of the dependence on the largest customer in terms of transaction volume suggest that the degree of 
small suppliers’ independence was the highest in 2008 and slightly declined after the crisis. Second, 
the degree of independence of small suppliers differs greatly across industries and across lead firms. 
Not all the small businesses have completely transformed into independent suppliers. 
7 Data for Japan taken from the Small Business White Paper 2009; data for China published in 
JETRO (2014). 
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Japanese small manufacturers explored the Chinese market through several channels. 
Some small firms followed lead firms to establish factories in China and others 
established relationships with new Japanese customers who had no business relations in 
Japan. Another group of small suppliers attempted to break away from the domestic 
network, starting business with non-Japanese customers, particularly Chinese local 
customers, who are precisely the subject of this paper’s analysis. Currently, it is still 
difficult to completely comprehend the entire picture of this type of small business in 
terms of transaction volume or other statistical indicators. 8 However, the emergence of 
this group illustrates a new pattern in the international division of labor in GVCs and 
therefore has great qualitative significance for the study of GVCs.   
 
3.2 Data 
 
The empirical material for this analysis comes from interviews conducted between 2009 
and 2011 by the Shanghai Branch of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). 
These interviews were with Japanese small suppliers that had been selected because 
they had achieved significant success in operating in the Chinese market and, 
particularly, in establishing business relationships with non-Japanese customers. The 
interview records have been edited as three reports (JETRO Shanghai 2010, 2011, 
2012). All of the reports and quotations were originally in Japanese and the author have 
translated them into English for this paper. In these reports, some interviews contain 
complete and detailed information on supplier strategy and chain governance, including 
on how they explored non-Japanese customers, how they managed relationships with 
customers, and how they facilitated localization.  
 
The total number of interview records included in these reports is 61. Based on these 
interviews, 15 suppliers were taken as case study samples. The procedure for the 
selection of cases were as follows: In the first step, as our focal point is the impact of 
Japanese small suppliers on the development of the Chinese manufacturing sectors, the 
interviews of 29 companies engaged in the production of consumer goods, medical 
                                                   
8 According to a 2013 survey on Japanese SMEs in overseas markets, for 41.4% of “capital goods” 
(machinery) suppliers and 58.1% of “intermediate goods” (parts) suppliers, Japanese companies in 
local markets are their largest customers. For 33.1% of “capital goods” suppliers and 15.4% of 
“intermediate goods” suppliers, non-Japanese companies in local markets are the largest customers 
(Small Business White Paper, 2014: Figure 3-4-43). However, we cannot find specific data regarding 
the customer situation in the Chinese market. 
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equipment, environmental equipment, software development, as well as those in the 
service sector, were excluded. 32 companies engaged in the production of parts or 
machinery, or engaged in the processing business, were selected. In the second step, the 
interviews of nine firms whose number of headquarter employees is more than 1,000 
was excluded.9 23 companies of small and medium-sized enterprises (Chusho Kigyo, 
the number of headquarter employees is 300 or less, or the company capital is 0.3 
billion yen or less), and medium-sized firms (Chuken Kigyo, the number of headquarter 
employees is 301-1,000), were selected. Lastly, eight companies that did not mention 
any information on supplier strategy and value chain governance were excluded as 
well.10 Following these three steps, 15 cases were selected from JETRO Shanghai 
reports (see Table 4). By means of a detailed examination of these successful cases, we 
might be able to gain an in-depth understanding of the role of small suppliers in GVCs 
and its implications for value chain governance.11 
 
<Table 4> 
 
4. Case study 
4.1 Profile of sample firms 
 
From Table 4, we can briefly describe the general profile of these small firms. Out of 15 
suppliers, nine are parts or materials manufacturers, six are machinery and equipment 
makers, and two are specialized processors. Since four of the firms are engaged in both 
providing parts and manufacturing machines, which is a significant feature of Japanese 
small manufacturers, the total sum is over 15.  
 
Most of these suppliers entered the Chinese market in the mid-2000s. As Table 3 
suggests, from this period “strong local demand” became the most important 
determinant for Japanese small businesses making direct investment in overseas 
markets. Eleven suppliers established their own production bases in China. Three 
suppliers achieved significant growth in China as the numbers of their employees in 
                                                   
9 JETRO reports treat these nine firms as SMEs as the number of local branch employees in China 
is 300 or less. However, we consider that the size of headquarter determines a company’s managerial 
resources and overseas investment, and thus excluded them from the case study samples.  
10 It appears that these companies do not employ any strategy to manage relations with customers as 
their products are good enough to attract local customers. However, we will not discuss them as a 
research subject in this paper. 
11 In this sense, this analysis is not representative of all Japanese SMEs in China, but only of a few 
successful cases. 
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local branches exceeded that of their headquarters. 
 
Customers of these small suppliers are diversified, coming not only from Japan, but also 
from mainland China, Taiwan, Korea, Europe, and the United States (US). Since the 
descriptions in JETRO reports regarding related indicators vary widely, it is difficult to 
identify the exact share of local Chinese customers in terms of sales volume or number 
of customers. But detailed information on supplier strategy and value chain governance 
in three reports concentrates on the relationship with Chinese customers. By analyzing 
these interviews, we might gain an understanding of the qualitative characteristics of the 
transactions between capable Japanese suppliers and less capable Chinese customers. 
 
4.2 Service strategy 
 
The major finding from the 15 selected cases is that all the Japanese suppliers actively 
adopted a service strategy, ranging from relatively passive problem solving and more 
active technological advice, to deeper collaboration, such as joint product development.  
 
Eight suppliers view problem solving as an important avenue of service (see Table 4). 
Regarding this point, the following message from a bearing supplier (No.14) is 
representative: 
 
“Our company has a way of thinking that ‘to be a problem solver of your customers!’ 
We believe in that if a customer is facing problems, new business opportunities must 
be lurking around there. We always train staff to respond to problems as quickly as 
they can. Then, as other problems arise, more and more customers would contact us 
once more.” 
 
Among these eight suppliers, one spring washer supplier (No.3) particularly highlighted 
the significance of rapid problem solving for coordination. As a latecomer with little 
technological capabilities, it is usually difficult for Chinese lead firms to manage 
complex coordination. To manufacture high-quality final products with higher value 
added, however, such coordination is inevitable. As a result, Japanese suppliers 
attempted to lead the process of coordination through rapid problem solving. A manager 
at the company stated its practice in detail: 
 
“In the case of Chinese firms, the product standards are not as unified as in Japan,  
and the drawings are rough. The bolt and our spring washer are thus often slightly  
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unfit with each other. In this situation, we usually make a sample first, and visit the  
customer to adjust the fitness with bolt. If they do not fit well, then, we will alter  
our production process as quickly as we can. The experience we accumulated in  
Japan over a long period enables this quick and accurate response.” 
 
Active technological advice or making proposals proactively, as a strategy, is more 
observed from this group of suppliers. Of the 15 firms, nine firms stressed this point 
(see Table 4). In this case, Japanese suppliers do not just resolve problems related to 
their own products, but also proactively provide various useful pieces of knowledge or 
information to customers to help them make better products and gain a deeper 
understanding of manufacturing.12 For this purpose, they insist on providing technical 
advice at a similar level as that seen in Japan, in spite of the Chinese customers’ weak 
technological and production capabilities. A supplier engaged in a laser cutting and 
precision sheet metal processing business (No.9) stated an interesting case in this 
regard: 
 
“When a customer is facing a problem, if we give explanation on technology or  
quality at as similar level as in Japan, the customer usually shows strong interest.  
For example, in the semiconductor and food sectors, scratches at the surface of a  
piece of equipment are likely to cause problems. However, local firms usually  
throw things on top of equipment or tread on materials. They do not understand  
their activities will affect the completion of products and cause serious problems.  
In this situation, we always explore first what kinds of (deep) problems the  
customer is facing in the environment of Chinese manufacturing, and then  
propose suitable solutions to them.” 
 
A few suppliers are more deeply involved in the customer’s process of product 
development. For example, a company supplying control systems for textile looms 
(No.11) spent five years jointly developing a new loom with their Chinese customers. 
Prior to that, the global market was dominated by a few Italian loom makers. The huge 
                                                   
12 During our own fieldwork, we also discovered that some suppliers provide to their customers 
knowledge that is clearly beyond the scope of their own business. For example, company A is a 
supplier of rubber and resin parts for automobiles. The company manager claimed that Chinese 
customers often encountered its products during the process of reverse engineering. However, they 
did not understand the function and importance of the materials his company used — they just 
wanted to purchase it at a cheap price. Meanwhile, Chinese automobile makers are very keen to 
learn any type of auto-related knowledge. In this situation, Company A teaches customers knowhow 
concerning the usage of its reinforcement materials, in addition to providing knowledge and 
information on other types of auto parts, and knowledge about on how to produce the entire vehicle. 
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and continually growing Chinese market enabled the new entry of Chinese firms and 
this new type of collaborative innovation.  
 
4.3 Relational governance 
 
In the context of GVC literature, the business relationships described above are 
typically “relational.” There are exchanges of uncodified knowledge through frequent 
face-to-face interaction, explicit coordination, and close mutual dependence (Gereiffi et 
al., 2005: 86). The Chinese customers are highly dependent on Japanese suppliers’ 
technological capabilities to resolve problems or to acquire new knowledge on 
manufacturing or product development. On the other hand, the Japanese suppliers not 
only rely on the Chinese customers’ capabilities to manufacture and sell the final 
products, but also need their information to develop better-fitting products for the 
Chinese market.13 
 
In the GVC literature, a high level of asset specificity was also highlighted as an 
important factor in relational governance (Gereiffi et al., 2005: 84). We can further 
scrutinize this concept to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
Japanese suppliers and Chinese customers. The concept of asset specificity was 
presented by Oliver Williamson. In addition to the three well-known types of asset 
specificity—site, physical, and human specificity—Williamson and his colleagues also 
identified a fourth dimension (Ouchi and Williamson, 1981), called “relational asset 
specificity” by Sturgeon (2002). According to Ouchi and Williamson (1981: 353), when 
a transaction represents relational specificity, 
 
 “specific language develops, and nuances are signaled and received in a sensitive  
way. Both institutional and personal trust relationships evolve. In consideration of  
the value placed upon economies of these kinds, agents who engage in recurring,  
uncertain, idiosyncratic transactions have a strong interest in preserving the  
exchange relation.” 
 
In the Japanese market, these four types of asset specificities have been significantly 
observed, particularly in transactions with tier two suppliers (Nishiguchi, 1994: Chapter 
5). In the case of Japanese small suppliers in China, however, we did not discover 
significant site, physical, or human specificity. This is because in an emerging market, 
                                                   
13 Two suppliers clearly mentioned this point. 
15 
 
customers are diversified and dispersed, making it unnecessary for small suppliers to 
open factories or prepare specific human resources for specific customers. Similarly, 
local companies generally do not have strong capabilities for a high level of product 
differentiation. They thus have to accept the specifications proposed by suppliers, which 
reduces the necessity for physical asset specificity.  
 
On the other hand, significant relational specificity has significantly appeared in the 
relationship between Japanese suppliers and Chinese customers. A statement by a 
supplier engaged in plating precision functional parts (No. 8) represents this typical 
relationship: 
 
“Our company always keep in mind that we need to actively propose to users  
and get technological consultation from them. Through this practice, we can  
establish trust with customers. If some problems we cannot resolve in China, we  
collaborate with Japanese headquarter to respond as soon as we can. We open the  
composition of costs to users. By doing so, we can let Chinese customers to  
understand us. It is as similarly important to create a long-term partnership with  
customers in China as in Japan.” 
 
Indeed, establishing a Japanese-style business relationship that is characterized by its 
long-standing nature and trust, namely, creating significant relational specificity, is 
exactly the ultimate purpose of these Japanese small suppliers (Asanuma, 1989; Sako, 
1992). As Table 4 suggests, of the 15 suppliers, there are nine firms that clearly 
expressed wishes to maintain long-term relations or establish trust (by opening up 
information about cost structures) with customers.  
 
It is clear that relational governance with strong relational specificity is costly and 
time-consuming. In view of this, why is this group of Japanese small suppliers, under 
limited managerial resources, so keen to adopt it rather than a simpler type of 
relationship such as one that is market-based or modular? 
 
The first reason why Japanese suppliers choose relational governance over all other 
types of relationships, is because of the low codifiability of products and services. Most 
of these suppliers are highly specialized in niche markets (see Table 4). In contrast to 
large suppliers that provide core components that can be modularized and used as 
turnkey solutions, it is difficult for small suppliers to modularize or standardize their 
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products or services. Instead, they are required to differentiate their products or services 
as much as possible in terms of customers’ diversified demands. 
 
Industrial characteristics further strengthen the low codifiability. In industries such as 
automotive, metalworking, and machinery that Japanese suppliers concentrate on, the 
interactions between parts or components are more unpredictable and modularity is 
more difficult to establish and more likely to break down. Small suppliers are thus 
strongly required to adopt relational governance to manage the widespread uncertainty 
characteristic of these sectors.  
 
The second reason is related to the price and quality of Japanese products. With regard 
to the query on “what is the strength of your company” (multiple answers), of the 11 
firms that clearly responded, eight firms answered high quality, while only one 
company answered low costs (see Table 4).14 Most Japanese suppliers emphasized that 
they would not be involved in the price competition with their Chinese counterparts. 
But high quality also implies high costs. In an extreme case of a supplier dealing with 
super-hard alloy material, wear resistant tools, and molds (No.13), the price of its 
products is five times higher than those of Chinese competitors, but the life span 
extends to nearly three to five times that of the Chinese products.15 Only those Chinese 
firms that have a strong desire to upgrade their products and enter higher-end markets 
are likely to accept such expensive products. Japanese suppliers thus have an incentive 
to establish relational governance to help these customers strengthen their technological 
capabilities and create value. 
 
4.4 Internationalization 
 
Japanese small suppliers have strong capabilities in terms of proposing new designs and 
technological advice to their customers. To apply these capabilities to the Chinese 
market, however, they must overcome internationalization difficulties.  
 
The first problem is exploring the great demand in the emerging Chinese market. For 
Japanese suppliers in the home market, marketing means maintaining stable business 
relationships with existing customers. Compared to Japan, the Chinese market is 
constantly expanding, and the number of new customers continues to increase. To 
                                                   
14 But this one company also stressed upon the high quality of their products. 
15 The manager at this company clearly confirmed that technical service charge is considered an 
important part of inclusion in the expensive material price. 
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respond to such an emerging market, Japanese suppliers must formulate marketing 
strategies more proactively. Of the 15 suppliers, 11 of them adopted active methods for 
seeking new customers as opposed to passively waiting for customers to contact them or 
relying on one particular customer (see Table 4). 16 
 
A diversified customer base not only increase their sales volume but also helps suppliers 
to gain key insight into customer demands, especially when suppliers visit customers for 
face-to-face communication. This in-depth understanding helps the supplier strengthen 
their leading positions in the market. For example, the aforementioned loom control 
system maker succeeded in establishing business relationships with all major local loom 
makers in China, which created a strong product development advantage. A manager at 
this company stated as follows: 
 
“In our company, Japanese deputy general manager and two local staffs in charge  
of marketing directly visit end users and loom makers to collect information.  
Through this method, we can directly understand customer needs, and develop  
new products based on this information. Therefore, even the Chinese imitation  
makers attempt to catch up, they will be two to three generations later than our  
company.” 
 
However, maintaining a base of diversified customers also leads to higher transaction 
costs on top of the transaction costs generated from geographic and cultural distances 
(Porter, 1990: 103). As a result, Japanese suppliers further adopted a localization 
strategy to reduce these transaction costs. Of the 15 suppliers, 12 suppliers engaged in 
localization, including training local personnel (10 firms) or shifting the power of 
decision making from Japanese headquarters to local branches (six firms, see Table 4).  
 
Training local personnel is particularly important to localization as Japanese staff alone 
cannot efficiently interact with local customers. In many cases, the local staff is required 
to have both marketing and technological capabilities simultaneously. With regard to 
this point, the aforementioned bearing supplier had a very insightful message: 
 
“The sales of our product itself would not increase if you do not understand  
technology. Therefore, we always try to train staffs who (understand both  
technology and marketing so that) can conduct deep marketing. We invite  
                                                   
16 Only one supplier primarily focuses sales on a single customer. 
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lecturers from China and other countries to implement technical training. For  
some very important customers, we provide technical support from Japanese  
headquarters, or I myself, as a person with technological background, will visit  
the customer together with our marketing staff. We also consider this is an  
important part of our training program.” 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The case of Japanese small suppliers has general relevance with regard to the study of 
GVCs. This case suggests that, since intermediate goods are usually technology- and/or 
capital-intensive, developing countries in particular are unable to promote their own 
competitive suppliers at the early stages of industrialization, thus making the role of 
capable foreign suppliers highly significant in GVCs. This also indicates that the 
knowledge sources in GVCs are diversified, consisting of not only huge multi-national 
companies as powerful buyers or key component suppliers, but also of numerous small 
suppliers. 
  
Existing studies have yielded a common conclusion that when a capable foreign 
supplier deals with customers from developing countries, who do not have sufficient 
expertise, products or services are generally provided through turnkey solutions and the 
governance pattern tends to be market. Under such relationships, although technological 
barriers to entry have been greatly reduced, the space for tacit knowledge learning or 
capability formation is largely confined. 
 
In contrast to the existing literature, we discovered a different approach for dealing with 
developing country customers. In this case, Japanese small suppliers provide not only 
good quality materials, parts, processing businesses, machineries, and equipment, but 
also various services for Chinese customers. As a result, a typical form of relational 
governance, characterized by long-standing business relations and significant relational 
asset specificity, has been established. Under this type of governance, suppliers, and 
customers share certain knowledge and power with each other. Japanese small suppliers 
actively share with Chinese customers, through active services and face-to-face 
communication, explicit and tacit knowledge on process improvement, quality control, 
and product development. In addition, they gain knowledge and information pertaining 
to the Chinese market by dealing with a diversified base of customers. Consequently, 
both Japanese small suppliers and Chinese customers have gradually gained certain 
powers and become indispensable to each other. 
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The adoption of relational governance by Japanese small suppliers results from the 
characteristics of the industry and the market. Japanese suppliers primarily specialize in 
niche markets, providing non-core parts or technologies, which are difficult to 
modularize. The industrial characteristics of the automotive, metalworking, and 
machinery industries further increase the difficulty of establishing modularity. 
Moreover, as products are high-quality but expensive, Japanese suppliers need to add 
value to the products and make themselves indispensable to their customers by 
providing a variety of customized services. 
 
Japanese small suppliers overcame various difficulties of internationalization to succeed 
in establishing relational linkages with Chinese customers. Through active exploration 
of new customers and localization, they were able to apply the strong technological 
capabilities that they accumulated in Japan to the emerging Chinese market. 
 
In the future, the service strategy and relational governance discussed in this case is 
likely to become more common in GVCs than the turnkey solution strategy. This is 
because the turnkey solution attempts to avoid complex coordination activities and is 
thus more suitable to underserved customers who have little technological capabilities. 
Along with economic development in emerging economies, however, per capita income 
will increase, which creates a larger demand for more sophisticated, higher value-added 
products. This requires more complex coordination activities and stronger technological 
capabilities (Humphrey et al., 2018). Foreign suppliers, through careful service strategy 
and relational governance, can help local companies to strengthen their technological 
capabilities so that they are able to manufacture better products. 
 
The findings of this paper might help to assess whether GVCs will be easily transferred 
from China to other countries. Due to the US-Sino Trade War and the COVID-19 
pandemic, an increasing number of people believe that China’s position in GVCs will 
be significantly weakened. As emphasized in this paper, to establish relational 
governance in GVCs is costly and time-consuming. In addition, the long-standing and 
trust-based relationships between foreign suppliers and domestic customers are not easy 
to collapse. Using Sturgeon’s term (2002), the “geographic flexibility” of GVCs is very 
low in the context of relational governance. In this sense, if China’s domestic market 
continues to expand and upgrade, and more and more foreign suppliers become 
involved in transactions with Chinese firms, then the position of China as a demand hub 
in GVCs is likely to become increasingly stronger. 
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Table 1  The number of customers that Japanese subcontractors always transact(％) 
  1 2～3 4～5 6～9 10～19 20～49 
50 and 
more 
1995 19.7 29.7 19.5 10.3 10.5 6.2 4.1 
1996 20.5 28.0 17.8 11.0 11.0 7.4 4.3 
1997 20.9 28.5 18.1 9.4 11.9 7.6 3.6 
1998 21.6 30.9 19.2 9.4 10.3 5.7 2.9 
1999 22.9 30.3 17.3 8.4 11.8 6.0 3.5 
2000 21.7 26.7 19.3 9.8 11.4 7.2 3.8 
2001 17.7 28.2 17.8 12.0 12.0 7.8 4.6 
2002 17.8 29.3 18.8 10.1 12.3 8.4 3.2 
2003 24.9 23.3 15.9 9.8 11.9 8.6 5.6 
2004 28.6 19.5 14.9 9.5 11.9 9.2 6.5 
2005 20.0 21.0 15.5 11.8 13.8 10.2 7.7 
2006 22.4 20.0 14.4 10.9 13.1 11.4 7.8 
2007 17.2 24.2 15.9 11.5 14.0 10.5 6.7 
2008 16.1 18.2 14.7 11.9 15.5 13.1 10.5 
2009 17.7 20.7 14.6 12.6 15.2 10.8 8.4 
2010 15.6 22.0 14.6 11.2 14.9 11.9 9.8 
2011 14.6 21.4 16.5 12.5 15.8 11.8 7.5 
Source: Tokyo Shoko Research (2012) 
    
Note: this survey used the term of "parent company (Oya Jigyosha)" to denote all the major 
customers that suppliers always transact. However, in most Japanese literature (see footnote 1), 
parent company refers to one or a small number of major customers. Therefore, we translate this 
term into "customer" here.  
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Table 2 Japanese subcontractors’ dependence on the largest customer in terms of 
transaction volume (%) 
  More than 50% 10-50% 
10％ and below 
 
  1991 50.5 45.8 3.7  
   1992 50.9 45.1 4.0  
   1993 51.3 45 3.7  
   1994 52.1 44.3 3.6  
   1995 52.4 44.4 3.3  
   1996 50.4 45.9 3.7  
   1997 50.2 45.7 4.1  
   1998 50.4 44.6 5.0  
   1999 49.2 45.5 5.3  
   2000 46.3 47.2 6.6  
   2001 48.4 46 5.5  
   2002 47.7 46.6 5.6  
   2003 44.6 46.7 8.7  
   2004 43.3 47.6 9.0  
   2005 43 47 10.1  
   2006 41.4 47.7 10.9  
   2007 40.4 49 10.7  
   2008 34.1 53.6 12.2  
   2009 37.5 51 11.5  
   2010 40.2 50.1 9.7  
   2011 40.4 50.1 9.5  
   Source: Tokyo Shoko Research (2012) 
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Table 3 Top three determinants of foreign direct investments by Japanese small businesses（％、multiple answers） 
         
Years 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
To ensure cheap and qualified 
labor 
31.2 19.9 22.8 26.3 27.7 20.4 28.4 27.2 
Strong local demands or good 
expectation on local demands 
29.3 28.7 30.4 31.6 33.2 39.5 45.5 49.0 
Follow customers and other 
Japanese firms 
23.7 17.0 18.5 20.6 21.1 16.4 25.5 30.1 
Source: Small business white paper 2014, Figure 3-4-10. 
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1 Various automotive-related springs, plastic
products, pipe-bending products, and
machinery and equipment
1997 〇 150 120
Japan、Taiwan、China、EU
and US
Problem solving - Q a T,S
2
Degreasing cleaning machine
2005
〇
220 165 Japan、China、Others Technological advice Good relation Q,B a T
3
Spring washer
2003
〇
214 136 Japan, China、Taiwan、
Korea
Problem solving - Q、L a -
4 Industrial spray nozzles, peripherals and
humidification systems
2006 - 400 15 Japan、China、Others Technological advice - D,E a T,S
5
Electronic display and related equipment
2004 〇 82 42 Japan、China、Others Problem solving,
technological advise
- - b T
6
High-grade lubricant
2005 - 16 7 Japan、China Technological advice - Q,D a,b T
7
Spring for electric and electronic parts
1996 〇 72 250 Japan, EU、Taiwan※ Problem solving,
technological advise
Open the cost D,Q,C b T
8 Plating on precision functional parts such
as mobile phones, automobiles, medical
equipment, etc.
2005 〇 180 80 Japan、China、Others Problem solving,
technological advise
Open the cost, long
term good relation
- b T,S
9
Laser cutting, precision sheet metal
processing
2006 〇 126 100 Japan、China、EU and
US、Korea, Other Aisan
countries
Problem solving,
technological advise
Good personal
relation
- a,b T,S
10 Industrial cleaning machines, and cleaning
liquids
2003 〇 55 70 Japan、China、EU and US Problem solving Long term relation F b -
11 Loom controller, industrial machine
control panel
2002 〇 44 120 Japan、China Joint product
development
- D a,b S
12
Commercial fire extinguisher
2003 - 295 14 Japan、China、Others Problem solving Long term relation - b -
13 Superhard alloy material, wear-resistant
tools, and molds
2004 - 1000 7 Japan、China Technological service,
problem solving
Long term relation Q a,b T
14
Bearing
1998 〇 749 100 Japan、China、Others Problem solving Long term relation D,Q a,b T
15
Precision mechanical parts
2004 〇 747 85 Japan、EU and US、China Problem solving,
technological advise
Long term relation Q,V b S
Notes:
Production base
in China
Localization
Methods for exploring non-Japanese customers: a = contact from customers and/or sales through a specific company; b = direct sales, multiple sales agents and/or using platforms （trade fairs, industrial parks, Internet）
※: This supplier does not have local Chinese customers but clearly treats the Taiwanese customers as local companies as their technological capabilities are limited.
Strengths:  Q= Quality、C= Cost、L= Lead time, D= Design、R&D、E= Energy saving、B= Branding、V= Variety
Localization: T= Training local personnel; S=Shift decision making power
Table 4 Information on basic situation, strategy and chain governance of Japanese small suppliers
Souce: JETRO (2009,2010,2011); Author's interviews.
Firm
number
Sectors Year of entry No. of headquarter
employees
No. of local branch
employees
Nationalities or regions of
customers in Chinese market
Services Japanese-style
business relation
Strengths
Methods for
exploring non-
Japanese
customers
 
